Coastal Land Use
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Water Code |
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Cases: |
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Waters; Navigable rivers;
Power of Secretary of Public Works to declare river navigable; Navigable
river, defined; Floatability under civil law and RA 2056
MACATANGAY v. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS
17 SCRA 31, 16 May 1966
NATURE: Appeal
from CFI order.
PONENTE: Bengzon, J.P., J.
FACTS:
A complaint was lodged against Macatangay for constructing dikes
and fillings on the Pantalan River in Sta. Clara, Batangas, Batangas.
The river was 3-foot deep at high tide, and about 2 to 1.5 feet
at low tide. It opens to the Batangas Bay and is used by Barrio
folks, including Macatangay, to transport salt, stones, sand, provisions
and supplies. Upon hearing, the Secretary found that the river was
navigable, thus, ordered the demolition of the dikes and the fillings
as they were obstructing passage. The CFI dismissed the appeal.
In this appeal, Macatangay insists that the river is not navigable;
that the finding as to navigability is one of fact, and that findings
of fact of the Secretary is not binding upon the court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the river was navigable.
HELD:
Yes.
RATIO:
RA 2056 authorizes the Secretary, after notice and hearing, to order
the demolition of dikes, etc. encroaching into any navigable rivers.
This power necessarily involves determination of questions of fact,
such as the existence of stream and its navigability. The findings
of the Secretary under RA 2056 are entitled to respect from courts,
in the absence of fraud, collusion or grave abuse of discretion.
None is present here.
Appellant
argues that the river is not navigable in law because it affords
passage only to small bancas and has not been shown as used or capable
of being used as a highway of commerce, as stated in American jurisprudence.
But “highway of commerce” does not mean a passage for
commercial intercourse of all kinds, like common carriers. 56 Am.
Jur. 647 states that if it is capable of being used for purposes
of commerce, no matter what mode the commerce may be carried on,
it is navigable in fact. It is sufficient if it be capable of floating
vessels, rafts of logs, or logs of quantities to make it of commercial
value. Furthermore, the rule in civil law is that a navigable river
is one that is floatable, i.e., a river admitting floats. In Villongco
v. Moreno, 31 Jan. 1962, the Court used floatability as the standard
for navigability.
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Waters/Seas; Spanish Law
of Waters of 1886; Salvage zone, classification
MARISTELA v. DIRECTOR OF LANDS
13 C.A.R. (2s) 941, 7 September 1968
NATURE: Appeal
from CFI judgment.
PONENTE: Alvendia, J.
FACTS:
Maristela sought registration of 2 parcels of land adjacent to the
sea. The Director of Lands and the Fisheries Commission opposed
stating that under the Spanish Law of Waters or 1886, 20 meters
should be allotted for public easement. They then argued that the
20-meter portion could not be available for private ownership because
it was part of the public domain.
ISSUE:
Whether or not salvage zone is of the public domain.
HELD:
No. It is subject to private ownership.
RATIO:
By the creation of the public easement of salvage comprising a zone
of 20 meters wide on estates adjacent to the sea or its shores,
the law recognizes private ownership of said estates because if
said estates belong to the State, the creation of an easement becomes
unnecessary. Furthermore, the provision in the law that the owner
of the lot may plant in the salvage zone proves that the law recognizes
private ownership of said portion.
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Waters; Foreshore lands;
“Riparian” as used in LAO 7-1; Littoral defined
SANTULAN
v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
80 SCRA 548, 15 December 1977
NATURE: Appeal
from CFI order.
PONENTE: Aquino, J.
FACTS:
This case involves a controversy as to who between Santulan and
Lusin should enjoy preference for the lease of a foreshore land.
It appeared incontrovertible that Santulan was first to occupy the
foreshore land in question as such was adjacent to his lot. The
Director of Lands ruled in favor of Santulan, using as basis Lands
AO 7-1 of 1936 which gives preferential right to riparian owners
to apply for foreshore lands. Same was done by the DANR Secretary.
However, the Executive Secretary ordered that a public bidding be
held because, according to him, LAO 7-1 had been rendered obsolete
by 1919 Public Lands Act, which was later on repealed by the 1936
Public Lands Act.
ISSUE:
Whether or not LAO 7-1 is obsolete.
HELD:
No.
RATIO:
Executive Secretary anchored his argument on the impression that
the provisions of the 1919 and the 1936 Land Acts were not the same.
But the fact is they are the same. Thus, it cannot be correctly
said that the LAO in question is obsolete.
The word “riparian” in the LAO is used in a broad sense
as referring to any property having a water frontage. Strictly speaking,
though, riparian refers to rivers. Hence, a riparian owner is one
who owns land on the bank of a river. But under the LAO, riparian
is more comprehensive. It does not only refer to riverbanks but
also to littoral owners, meaning the owners of lands bordering the
shore of the sea or lake or other tidal waters. The littoral is
the coastal region including both the land along the coast and the
water near the coast or the shore zone between the high and the
low watermarks.
The reason for the preferential right is the same as the justification
for giving accretions to the riparian owner which is that accretion
compensate the riparian owner for the diminutions which his land
suffers by reason of the destructive force of the waters.
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